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CASE NOTES
that the present case would have been decided differently if the cause of
action had arisen after the Code had been enacted. If this be the case,
one wonders why the court failed to seize upon this opportunity to render
a decision in consonance with current legislative thinking in this area of
the law.
ROBERT F. MCGRATH
Article and Book Review Editor
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Single Act Statute Will Subject
Foreign Corporation to State Jurisdiction.—Atkins v. Jones El Laugh-
lin Steel Corp.1 —Jones & Laughlin, a Pennsylvania corporation,2 manufac-
tured liner and metal containers, and sold them to the defendant Montanin Co.,
a New York corporation, for use by Montanin's agents in bottling and label-
ing a hydrofluorsilicic acid, for subsequent resale by Montanin Co. Montanin
had no agent, office, or qualification as a foreign corporation in Minnesota,
and its only contacts in that state consisted in shipment of its product
F.O.B. New York upon direct order from resident consumers, or indirect
order from resident independent distributors. Operations had been carried on
in this manner in Minnesota for fifty years, Montanin accepting all orders
in New York, and billing consumers direct. Although the independent dis-
tributors did receive commissions on sales from their orders, there was al-
legedly no implied or express contractual relationship between them and
Montanin. The plaintiff, a truck driver for a Minnesota carrier for the de-
liveries in Minnesota, was injured as a result of inhaling toxic fumes
allegedly produced by leakage from a faulty container of acid. The suit was
commenced pursuant to a Minnesota statute which provided that commis-
1 104 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1960).
2 The defendant Jones & Laughlin had no agents, made no contracts, and main-
tained neither an office nor solicitors in Minnesota. In fact its only connection with the
principal case is that it manufactured the container for Mon tanin's acid, and allegedly
inspected same without due care, since there was evidence that one of them was faulty—
thus the claim against Jones & Laughlin on the basis of manufacturer's liability. This
defendant did not appear in the case either specially to challenge jurisdiction, or to
plead to the merits, and therefore suffered judgement by default as to the jurisdictional
issue. It is submitted that this judgement might be challenged in another forum should
action on a judgment be sought after successful trial on the merits still pending.
a Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13, subd. 1 (1957). "A foreign corporation shall be sub-
ject to service as follows:
(3) If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota, or if such foreign cor-
poration commits , a tort in whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota,
such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation
and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the foreign corporation of the
Secretary of the State of Minnesota and his sucessors to be its true and lawful attorney
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings against the
foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or tort . . . the mak-
ing of the contract or the committing of the tort shall be deemed to be the agreement
of the foreign corporation that any process against it which is so served upon the
Secretary of State shall be of the same legal force and effect as if served personally
within the State of Minnesota."
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sion of a tort in whole or in part by a foreign corporation resulting in in-
jury to a resident was deemed to be "doing business", and therefore subjected
the corporation to the jurisdiction of the court of Minnesota by construc-
tive service and notice. The plaintiff sought damages from Montanin for
alleged negligent containment of the acid and proceeded against Jones &
Laughlin for alleged negligent manufacture of the containers. Montanin
appeared specially and made a motion to quash service of process and to
dismiss. The trial court denied the motion and the Supreme Court of
Minnesota affirmed. HELD: The statute, in so far as it provides the criteria
for jurisdiction and validity of constructive service, does not offend the
Fourteenth Amendment, since in personam jurisdiction obtains whenever a
defendant has certain minimum contacts within the state, and personal
injury to a resident of the state caused by defendant's product constitutes
such contact.
The Due Process requirements for state court jurisdiction over foreign
corporations were re-examined and modified 4 by the decision of International
4
 Traditionally a plaintiff could meet the requirements for in personam jurisdiction
over individual defendants by establishing physical presence, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877); domicile, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); consent, Adam v. Saenger,
303 U.S. 59 (1938); or activities within the state, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926).
Many of these same criteria were applicable to fulfill the requirements for jurisdiction
over corporations, but the two main theories of corporate jurisdiction were presence and
consent. Since a corporation was not a citizen, and therefore not entitled to rights under
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,
it could be excluded from a state so far as intrastate business was concerned. Cf. Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). If it were admitted it could be made to conform
to regulations to promote health, safety, and welfare of the residents whether it was
engaged in intrastate or interstate activities. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S, 61
(1954); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Spout v. South Bend,
277 U.S. 163 (1928); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925); International Harvester
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). It was the prevailing view that incorporation by pro-
moters within a state, was in fact, if not by the form of the articles, consent to the
jurisdiction of the state. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423, 429 (1870);
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). Although a state could not
condition admittance of a foreign corporation engaged in Interstate commerce upon sur-
render of its constitutional rights by requiring it to appoint an agent for service of
process, or requiring other express consent to jurisdiction, if the corporation failed to
so consent or to designate an agent, the state could provide for substituted service on a
state official by finding sufficient presence from its business operations to imply consent.
Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361
(1933) (dictum); Philadelphia R. Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Old Wayne
Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1906). In this regard mere solicitation
of business was not considered sufficient. Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918); International Harvester v. Kentucky, supra. Single or occasional
acts have also been held insufficient for such implication of consent. Rosenberg Bros. &
Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Green v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S.
530 (1907); Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, supra. State Jurisdiction
was founded upon the theory that if an individual not a resident, or a foreign corpora-
tion entered the state to beneficially transact business, then it must assume the liabilities
and responsibilities attaching thereon by submission to suit arising from that business.
It would be reasonably more convenient for the corporation to answer in the state of its
acts if sufficient business was therein being transacted, than for the party resident to
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Shoe Co. v. Washington.5 This decision applied a rationale requiring an
analysis of the quality and nature of the activity in the state, rather than a
mere consideration of the quantum of business activity in order to establish
sufficient and equitable basis for jurisdiction. This standard, i.e., whether the
"corporation had certain minimum contacts with the state such that the
maintenance of the suit would not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice," encompasses the criteria of both the "presence" and
"consent" doctrines.° It includes recognition of a state's interest in a par-
ticular kind of corporate activity—in lieu of the "systematic and continuous"
nature of a corporation's activities—as a reason for requiring the corporation
to be prepared to answer claims against it arising from such activity within
travel to the state of its incorporation. Latimer v. A/A Industrias F. Matavazzo, 175
F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949); Kilpatrick v. Texas & D. Ry.,
166 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1949) (dictum), If the corpora-
tion were not transacting a significant volume of business so as to be considered "present,"
but the nature of the activity were such as to create sufficient danger to the residents, or
of a nature to create other special state interest, then exceptions were made to the re-
quirement of presence or consent. See the Non-Resident Motorist cases; Young v. Masci,
289 U.S. 253 (1933) ; Hess v. Pawloski, supra; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160
(1916). See also the insurance company cases holding that isolated acts which attract
sufficient state interest come within its police power and are therefore sufficient basis for
jurisdiction. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). See also the "Blue Sky" law cases such
as Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
5 326 U.S. 310 (1945), a case in which a Delaware Corporation with its principal
place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, was held liable for a sales tax in Washington since
it had salesmen and contracts in that state. In modifying the presence doctrine and the
implied consent tests of prior decisions, this decision established the criteria for juris-
diction applied in present cases. It affirmed the theory that a corporate personality is
a fiction intended to be acted upon as a fact, and therefore its presence, unlike that
of an individual, is manifested by its activities. Cf. Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282
U.S. 19, 24 (1930). International Shoe at page 320 states: "Due Process requires only
that in order to get in personam jurisdiction, if it be not present, it must have certain
minimum contacts with the . . • (state) such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." This was a modifi-
cation of the Solicitation-Plus rule applied by the Washington Supreme Court in up-
holding the state's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court decision goes on to state that the
conclusion in each case must be based upon a fair consideration of all relevant matters
including among others: the nature and extent of the corporation's actual activities
within the state, and whether sporadic, casual, or systematic and continuous over a
substantial period of time; its consequent points of contact or lack thereof within the
state; the nature of the particular transaction, contract or tort, relied upon by the
resident plaintiff occurring within the state; and how such activities affect general policy
of the state with regard to the subject matter and relative inconvenience to the respec-
tive parties. The Court states at page 327 that the "demands of Due Process may be
met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it
reasonable in the context of our federal system of government to require the corpora-
tion to defend the particular suit brought. . . . An estimate of the inconveniences
which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its home or principal
place of business is relevant in this connection." The Court is quoting from Hutchinson
v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
6 International Shoe v. Washington, supra note 5 at 320, 322, 325.
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the state. Moreover, some consideration should be given to factors which
would be pertinent to the issue of forum non conveniens. 7
Adoption of legislation like the Minnesota statute would seem to be an
attempt to extend state jurisdiction beyond the scope of the International
Shoe standard, in the light of an apparent qualification made by the Hanson
v. Denckla decisions to the effect that it is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the state of the forum, thus invoking
the protection of its laws. The purpose of these single-act statutes is to
grant a resident, injured by the wrongful act of a foreign corporation, the
convenience and certainty of remedy offered by a court of that state, by
predicating jurisdiction solely upon acts done, or liabilities incurred, within
the state whether or not there is consent, or other contact between the cor-
poration and the state.° They are therefore designed to preclude the neces-
sity of establishing either minimum contacts of a beneficial nature to the
corporation or activity of a sufficiently dangerous nature to justify a peculiar
state interest. This design was bared by the principal case, where the
Minnesota Court upheld jurisdiction purely on the fact that the injury—which
resulted from a tort perpetrated outside the state—occurred within the state,
the state of the injury therefore determining not only the applicable law,"
but also the jurisdiction of the court of that state.
Five other states have similar statutes," but significantly, in each case
' 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952), enacted after the International Shoe case, provides for
transfer to a more convenient forum, and has been held not to pre-empt the considera-
tion of balance of inconvenience in determination of jurisdiction, since jurisdiction is a
condition precedent to power to transfer the case. Smith v. Louisville & N. R.R., 90
F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). But § 1404(a) does not apply to state courts and at
least one court has indicated that calendar restrictions, etc. applicable to forum non
conveniens under § 1404(a) would not be relevant to jurisdiction under International
Shoe. Cf. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 78 (Tent. Draft #3 1956).
8 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The court in this case recognized that the recent develop-
ment of modern transportation systems made defense of actions in foreign jurisdictions
less burdensome but noted: " . . . it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the
eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . . These
restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga-
tion. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
states. . . . However minimal their burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a de-
fendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the minimal contacts with
that state that are pre-requisite to its exercise of power over him. . . It is essential
in each case that there he some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." (357 U.S. at 251).
9
 Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin, supra note 1, at 894.
10 Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 378, 379 (1934).
11 III. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1959) provides as one basis for personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant, "the commission of a tortious act within this state";
N.C. Gen. Stat. 55-145(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1959) provides that a foreign defendant
may be sued "on any cause of action arising . . . out of tortious conduct in this state,
whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance"; Vt. Stat. tit. 12, § 855 (1947) reads
like the Minnesota statute that if a foreign corporation "commits a tort in whole or in
part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed doing
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which has upheld such a statute as authorizing jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation, the action was for damages caused by tortious activity within
the forum state. 12
 Moreover, many cases have allowed jurisdiction if continu-
ous business,13 implicit agency," or sufficient inherent danger in the
product's were established in addition to the injury. The Minnesota Court
was faced with the problem of its ability under such a statute to sustain
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant whose alleged tortious
activities all occurred outside of Minnesota. 16
business in Vermont by such foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by such foreign corporation of the Secretary of State of Vermont to be its
true and lawful attorney .. ."; W. Va. Code ch. 31, art. 1 § 3083 (Supp. 1959) provides
that "a foreign corporation .. shall be deemed to be doing business . . . if such cor-
poration commits a tort in whole or in part in this state"; Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 92(d)
(1957) subjects a foreign corporation to suit on "liability incurred for acts done within
this state."
12 The Vermont statute was construed in Smythe v. Twin State Improvement
Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), and held valid as applied to a Massachusetts
company which came into Vermont and negligently did some repairs on the house of
a Vermont resident. The Illinois statute was sustained in Nelson v. Miller, 11 111, 2d 378,
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) as applied to a defendant, a resident of Wisconsin, who had
sent an employee into Illinois to install a stove for the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was
helping to unload the stove, defendant's employer negligently pushed it so as to injure
the plaintiff's hand; In Painter v. Home Finance Company, 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 73
(1957), the North Carolina statute was held effective to give the court jurisdiction in a
tort action against a foreign corporation for wrongfully repossessing plaintiff's auto-
mobile by duress, the cause of action arising out of defendant's tortious conduct com-
mitted within North Carolina; the Maryland statute was involved in Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950). In that case the plaintiff had
been injured when a grinding wheel, manufactured by a Massachusetts corporation
shattered while in use on a grinding machine made by a Texas corporation whose agent
recommended the use of the grinding wheel of the Massachusetts corporation. In an
action against both corporations, the federal district court dismissed as against the
Massachusetts corporation since it "had no transaction within the state in relation to
the tort liability alleged . ." (80 F. Supp. at 661) but upheld jurisdiction over the
Texas corporation since the complaint against it was "for tort occurring in Maryland ..."
(89 F. Supp. at 662), i.e., its agent's misrepresentation.
13 Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, afi'd on rehearing, 202 F.2d
530 (9th Cir. 1953) ; cf. Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir.
1943) ; William J. Harlick Co. v. Boque Elec. Mfg. Co., 146 F. Supp. 347 (D.C. Mass.
1956); Orange Crush Grapico Bottling Co. v. The Seven-Up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174
(N.D. Ala. 1955).
14 Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957); cf. Lone Star
Motor Import Co. v. Ciroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960); But cf.
Swavely v. Vandergift, 397 Pa. 281, 154 A.2d 779 (1959).
15 Green v. Equitable Powder Co., 99 F. Supp. 237 (ED. Ark. 1951).
18 In Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.S. Ill. 1957), the
federal district court construed the Illinois statute so as not to authorize jurisdiction over
the non-resident manufacturers of a power lawn mower that injured an Illinois plaintiff
where the manufacturing took place in Ohio and Wisconsin; in Putnam v. Triangle
Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957), a Pennsylvania magazine publisher
sold its magazines to newsdealers in North Carolina, shipping them from outside North
Carolina. The court affirmed the dismissal of a libel action by a North Carolina resident
against the Pennsylvania publisher because the injury did not arise out of tortious con-
duct in North Carolina. See also, Erlanger Mills Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239
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It is probable that the defendant Montanin by its continuous sales
activity in Minnesota for fifty years would have fallen within the "minimum
contacts" test of International Shoe if it had been applied. Since Montanin
had obtained the benefits of the business in the state it seems reasonable
to impose jurisdiction, but to do so purely in reliance on the "commits a
tort in whole or in part" clause of the Minnesota Statute is another matter.
The Minnesota Federal District Court has twice denied jurisdiction when
this very statute was pleaded as the predicate. In Mueller v. Steelcase Inc. 17
where a defective chair manufactured by a foreign corporation caused injury
to a resident, and in Dahlberg Corp. v. American Sound Products Co. 18
where unfair business competition outside the state resulted in damage to
a resident corporation, it was held that the "minimum contacts" test had
not been satisfied. These two decisions, to the effect that other contacts of
a beneficial nature,1° in addition to injury within the state, are necessary
before a foreign corporation is subjected to litigation within the state, would
seem in accord with the majority interpretation of similar statutes. A prior
Minnesota case, Beck v. Spindler, 20 adopts this interpretation in qualifying
the application of this same statute. Although the case is distinguishable in
the nature and quality of the contacts involved, it is notable for the court's
reluctance to base jurisdiction solely on the application of the statute. 21
Considering the case law in other jurisdictions and that of Minnesota
itself, it would seem the Court has sounded a rather uncertain trumpet in
its attempt to replace the existing standard with a new rigid jurisdictional
formula based only on a strict interpretation of this statute. As previously
mentioned the defendant Montanin Corporation might well have qualified for
Minnesota jurisdiction upon an application of the "minimum contacts" test,
but certainly the defendant Jones & Laughlin would not have so qualified
under this same test. With respect to this transaction, Jones & Laughlin
had no business contacts with Minnesota, but operated solely outside the
state, and was only involved through a supply contract with the other de-
fendant, without privity or connection to the purchaser or the plaintiff. Nor
was the nature of the article manufactured of such inherent danger as to be
the subject of foreseeable injury to a plaintiff such as the one in the principal
case. Jones & Laughlin would more nearly parallel the status of the exonerated
corporation in Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.22 which although
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); See Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., supra note
12; Reilich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts over Foreign Corporations under Act of
1937, 3 Md. L. Rev. 35 (1938).
17 172 F. Supp. 416 (D.C. Minn. 1959).
18 179 F. Supp. 928 (D.C. Minn. 1960).
10 In the Dahlberg case, the Court said ". . . the fact that the effects of the tortious
acts of American Sound Products in competing unfairly elsewhere in the country may
have been felt in Minnesota by plaintiff to its damage is not the type of activity which
creates contacts with Minnesota so that the tort-feasor is amenable to substituted
service." [179 F. Supp. at 932 (emphasis supplied)].
20 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
21 99 N.W.2d at 677.
22 Supra note 12.
394
CASE NOTES
responsible for the defective product causing injury, was held not subject to
Maryland State Court jurisdiction. It would therefore seem apparent that
this former defendant would not qualify under any existing test, as subject
to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court. Yet by the kind of strict appli-
cation of the statute which occurred with respect to Montanin, Jones &
Laughlin would likewise be held subject to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota
court.
Should the theory of the Atkins decision remain undisturbed, there is
the danger that a formal statutory definition of "doing business" would re-
place the substance requirement of "minimum contacts." A corporate manu-
facturer would be subject to suit anywhere that a consumer might carry
his product, or whence it might wend its way by resale, as long as a similar
statute were provided. This would hardly be within the traditional notions
of "fair play and substantial justice" since no consideration would be given
to the extent of the corporate activity, the systematic or continuous nature
of such activity, the points of contact of the activity within the state, or the
parens patrioe interest of the state in the dangerous nature of the activity
akin to the non-resident motorist cases. Instead this decision would eliminate,
in a tort action, the necessity for the evaluation proposed in International
Shoe, and narrow the test to the single factor of injury within the forum
state. Removal of the restrictions imposed in Hanson v. Denckla 23 and other
cases,24
 by the Supreme Court of the United States must precede the affirma-
tion of this decision, since it is hardly within the purview of a state to alter
so sweepingly the Constitutional tests for jurisdiction.
CARROLL E. DUBUC
Constitutional Law—State Application of Privilege Tax to Carrier in
Interstate and Intrastate Commeree.—Oregon-Nevada-California
Fast Freight, Inc. v. Stewart. 1—The taxpayer was an interstate motor
carrier with its main office in California, but with terminals in Oregon, which
it leased. Taxpayer engaged primarily in interstate commerce but did have
some intrastate operations in Oregon. An Oregon statute imposed an excise
tax for the privilege of carrying on or doing business in the state of Oregon. 2
The tax assessed was under an apportionment formula which compared the
total miles traveled in Oregon by the taxpayer to the total mileage traveled
by taxpayer in its entire operation . 3
 The resulting fraction was applied to
the carrier's net income to determine the amount of the tax. The defendant
tax commissioner assessed a tax under the statute; the taxpayer paid
under protest and then commenced suit for a refund. The taxpayer con-
23 Supra note 8.
24 Supra note 4.
1 353 P.2d .541 (Ore. 1960).
2 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 317.070 [amended by c. 607 § 3, c. 709 § 1(3), (1957); c. 631
§ 2 (1959)1.
3 Ore. Rev. Stat.	 317.180 (Repealed), now replaced by § 314.280 (1959).
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